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A B S T R A C T
Maintaining Information Security and protecting data assets remains a principal concern
for businesses. Many data breaches continue to result from accidental, intentional or ma-
licious human factors, leading to financial or reputational loss. One approach towards
improving behaviours and culture is with the application of on-going awareness activities.
This paper presents an approach for identifying security related human factors by incor-
porating personas into information security awareness design and implementation. The
personas, which are grounded in empirical data, offer a useful method for identifying au-
dience needs and security risks, enabling a tailored approach to business-specific awareness
activities. As a means for integrating personas, we present six on-going steps that can be
embedded into business-as-usual activities with 90-day cycles of awareness themes, and
evaluate our approach with a case study business. Our findings suggest a persona-centred
information security awareness approach has the capacity to adapt to the time and re-
source required for its implementation within the business, and offer a positive contribution
towards reducing or mitigating Information Security risks through security awareness.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Information Security issues are now prevalent concerns for
organisations, specifically where issues directly impact upon
regulatory, risk-based or reputational concerns resulting from
intrusions and losses of data. Industry reports such as the PwC
2015 Data Breach report (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2015)
highlight a large number of internal data breaches are still di-
rectly attributed to human factor issues, either intentional,
accidental or with malicious intent. Businesses can no longer
rely solely on process and technology for risk reduction of
security issues, and need a greater consideration towards people
integration with process and technology.
Although mandated for some, security education, aware-
ness and training can support general understanding of issues
through mandatory or annual refresher content. Several ap-
proaches exist for addressing security awareness, however, their
focus is generally towards achieving compliance aspects. For
example, applying and maintaining data confidentially, integ-
rity and availability risk reducing controls. In most cases, a
blanket approach would be applied without tailoring to the
actual human factors involved. Human interaction that is
central to business, processes, and system interaction therefore
needs to be understood if security awareness needs are to be
effectively addressed.
Research suggests current security awareness approaches
do not entirely meet this requirement of designing for the user.
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As a means to bridge this gap, an opportunity is presented to
explore Human Computer Interaction (HCI) techniques that
could be incorporated into a security awareness approach.We
illustrate the application of such techniques through the use
of personas. Personas are archetypical descriptions of users that
embody their goals (Cooper, 1999). By representing arche-
types of business users, personas offer insights into users that
may otherwise be overlooked. Personas as user models can also
be useful for identifying threats, vulnerabilities and likely areas
of risk in their given environment (Faily and Fléchais, 2010a).
The output of the personas could, therefore, be used to tailor
security awareness needs using relevant topics and content ad-
dressing current business and people risks. Personas may also
be incorporated into the awareness content itself, or poten-
tially used for other process and procedure modification or
security and risk assessment purposes.
To explore the potential of adopting a user-centred ap-
proach to security awareness, this paper illustrates an approach
where the creation and application of personas was used to
address business specific human factors within awareness
activities. Our approach uses personas as a means of identi-
fying audience needs and goals for security awareness
requirements. These aim to address relevant human factors
to reduce risk and improve a security minded culture. To
demonstrate how personas may be integrated into an on-
going cycle of security awareness, the steps taken leading to
the design and implementation are incorporated within six
on-going awareness programme steps. These build on posi-
tive features of other awareness approaches where they
apply, making it relevant to persona integration and business
tailored security awareness output. This can be embedded
into business-as-usual activities with 90-day cycles of aware-
ness themes to ensure a more frequent up-to-date approach
towards addressing relevant security risks through security
awareness.
To provide an overview in support of our approach, we
begin by first considering existing frameworks and commu-
nication approaches for security awareness in Section 2. We
consider current challenges, benefits and drawbacks, and how
the use of personas may be integrated. Based on the research
findings, we address the research gap by presenting a process
for a persona-centred methodology in Section 3, integrating
personas to help identify and reduce risk through tailored
security awareness. Findings from testing elements of the
approach with a case-study business, referred to as Company
X, are detailed throughout Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss
observations from the application of one approach towards
combining HCI techniques into security awareness design
requirements, aiming to reduce or mitigate Information Se-
curity risks.We then conclude in Section 6 and detail directions
for future work.
2. Related work
2.1. Information security awareness challenges
and opportunities
Raising awareness and changing security behaviour can be chal-
lenging, given the audience must be engaged with the reality
of threats, and understand the process for identifying and
addressing issues or concerns.The audience must then be mo-
tivated into applying positive behaviours, change risk
perceptions (Roper et al., 2006) and engrained behaviours, sup-
ported by relevant topics that are not overly information-
heavy (ENISA, 2006).
Challenges identified by Bada et al. (2015) found annual
awareness and compliance orientated programmes were often
treated as tick-box exercises and do not always lead to desired
behaviours. Some approaches rely on invocations of fear to
change behaviours, or result in a lack of motivation and
ability to meet unrealistic expectations, which may derive
from poorly designed security systems and policies (Bada
et al., 2015). In some cases, security awareness goals were
clearly identified and communicated. However, on a cultural
level, people did not feel a need to browse internal security
guidance as users did not believe they had security concerns
(Maqousi et al., 2013). Some felt a lack of reward or recogni-
tion for applying positive behaviours, or did not feel empowered
to make information or technology security decisions
(Dominguez et al., 2010).
Awareness programmes were more likely to be successful
when receiving top-level buy-in, business-wide support en-
gaging with awareness, commitment and co-operation
towards a security culture, using a participative creative
design process tailored to business needs. Awareness
should be communicated by a variety of means relevant to
the business, its people and culture, and is best reinforced
using an on-going 90-day programme (Manke and Winkler,
2012).
Delivery of awareness content should be engaging, appro-
priate and on-going, with a range of relevant topics that are
targeted, actionable, doable and provides feedback to help
sustain people’s willingness to change (Bada et al., 2015). Com-
munications must reinforce each other with a consistent
message delivered across a number of channels to a culture
addressed in a synchronous manner that supports the goals
of the awareness programme (Beyer et al., 2015; Roper et al.,
2006). Also, consider effectiveness across genders, genera-
tions or roles, of focusing on communicating how to achieve
something, rather than dictating what should not be done
(Manke and Winkler, 2012).
Baseline measures should be taken to establish needs and
metrics relevant to the target audience and programme output
(ENISA, 2006). Measuring the level of awareness is, however,
more complicated, given that questionnaires can indicate a
level of knowledge, but may not imply levels of motivation to
improve behaviours (Bada et al., 2015). Awareness evaluation
may be built-in using evaluation cycles embedded into the
programme’s awareness activities, and be considered at levels
of Management, Audience, and Effectiveness against measur-
able performance objectives of awareness topics (Roper et al.,
2006). Breach notifications or queries may also increase, there-
fore clarity may be required as to whether more issues are
occurring or the increases are due to raised awareness (Roper
et al., 2006).
An awareness programme should use simple consistent rules
of behaviour for employees, offering increased perception of
control and better acceptance of suggested behaviours. Cul-
tural differences in risk perceptions should be considered when
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embedding positive security behaviours with support, knowl-
edge and awareness (Bada et al., 2015).
2.2. Information security awareness approaches
Responsibility, trust, communication, and co-operation are said
to be the four cornerstones of an engaging security culture.
Using an approach that motivates and empowers employees
to play an active role in security is important towards achiev-
ing awareness and positive behaviours. Awareness output
should be tailored to employees’ organisational context, ad-
dressing specific security needs on an on-going basis to reinforce
awareness, embedding security practices into normal routine
of a security minded culture (Beyer et al., 2015).
ENISA (2006) awareness initiatives use a three-phase ap-
proach of Plan and Assess, Execute and Manage, Evaluate and
Adjust. This includes sub-steps considering resource, budget,
project team, programme materials, defines goals and objec-
tives, programme implementation, evaluation of effectiveness,
and considers updates ready for the next cycle to begin when
required (ENISA, 2006).
The NIST special publication by Wilson and Hash (2003)
offered a comprehensive guide towards designing, develop-
ing, implementing and maintaining a framework using a life-
cycle approach to address Information Security risks and
awareness. A needs assessment would first be conducted es-
tablishing business needs, risks, resource, geography, roles,
responsibilities, budget and other project related dependen-
cies (Wilson and Hash, 2003). Following implementation,
feedback mechanisms with manual and automated monitor-
ing and tracking should assist measurement of the programme’s
effectiveness. Furthermore, new approaches, policies, proce-
dures and technology should be considered and incorporated
into revisions of the programme, ensuring it remains effec-
tive and up-to-date (Wilson and Hash, 2003).
Other similar life-cycle approaches include The Security
Culture Framework (Roer, 2015) that offers a generic ap-
proach towards promoting security awareness.This aims to set
organisation goals and measures, involve the right people in
the project cycle, understand the audience and build trust,
choose relevant activities and topics, then plan, execute,
measure and revise the programme (Roer, 2015). Alterna-
tively, the Security Awareness Cycle (Mannerud, 2014)
establishes baseline metrics, identifies the relevant audi-
ence, desired behaviours and high risks, and solutions to
facilitate a behavioural change mitigating risks (Mannerud,
2014).Whereas, the framework by Maqousi et al. (Maqousi et al.,
2013) had similar steps, but gave a specific focus towards
methods of delivering computer and web-based security
awareness.
An awareness programme can also be approached as a
branded marketing activity promoting Information Security to
employees as a product. This incorporates techniques such as
surveys and focus groups to understand required design content
and context, with added branding addressing elements of emo-
tions, values, impressions and expectations, supported by
relevant security metrics (Hinson, 2013).
Awareness content and communications may cover a range
of delivery methods and topics applicable to business require-
ments and available resources. This should incorporate ease
of use, scalability, interactivity, and accountability, with con-
tinued improvement being amain goal (Wilson and Hash, 2003).
Awareness material should be developed towards relevant roles,
behaviours and required skill-sets applicable to functions
(Wilson and Hash, 2003). Another approach uses an on-going
life-cycle for the awareness communications avoiding inef-
fective repetitive general advice, and tailored to business needs
and behaviours (Beyer et al., 2015). Communication methods
could include participatory methods such as games, quizzes,
short video clips, or short topic briefs included as part of team
meetings, which may incorporate rewards or recognitions for
positive behaviours (Beyer et al., 2015). Other methods include
face-to-face training sessions, e-mail messages, presenta-
tions by speakers (Dominguez et al., 2010), guidelines, booklets,
posters, and awareness training workshops.
Gundu and Flowerday (2013) note that security campaigns
may require additional budget in terms of direct and indirect
costs included in production and maintenance of the pro-
gramme, although it is suggested that use of e-learning can
reduce distribution costs (Gundu and Flowerday, 2013). Online
tools could also enable greater user interaction, such as online
forums, news sections, alerts, and surveys. This could be de-
livered by a range of web-based tools, and maintained with
appropriate up-to-date content. A review of relevant aware-
ness metrics could then be conducted by specific reviewing
team, or administrative and technical staff (Maqousi et al., 2013).
2.3. Persona research
Many of the awareness frameworks and approaches re-
viewed relied on some form of data collection to understand
the environment, and in varying degrees, its people and culture.
Personas – archetypical descriptions of users that embody their
goals – could instead be used as a tool primarily within the
design stage to address these areas.Within focus groups or team
meetings, considering how personas might behave is also a
useful technique for on-going awareness building. Rather than
modelling inaccurate general stereotypes of users, the use of
personas representing archetypes of business users can be used.
This approach was arguably first popularised by Cooper (1999)
and has since grown in their usage across different domains,
such as marketing, websites and interface designs using varied
design approaches.
Nielsen (2015) identifies four common design approaches
used for personas:
• A goal-directed perspective that considers psychological
aspects of the design process;
• A role-based approach focusing on specific target roles and
collects a range of data through qualitative and quantita-
tive methods;
• A fiction-based perspective usually designed using intu-
ition or assumptions to formulate the personas;
• An engaging perspective created with the use of data.
According to Norman (2004), fiction based or assumptive per-
spectives are used to create an empathetic focus in the design
process. Whereas, engaging perspectives provide a story-
oriented approach towards visualising character descriptions
using a narrative building the story’s beginning, middle and
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end (Nielsen, 2015), supported by story and scenario contexts
(Madsen and Nielsen, 2010).
When creating personas, the design team is likely to include
a range of roles (Pruitt and Grudin, 2003) who may begin by
obtaining and analysing background information and data from
various sources, leading to a view towards areas of user focus.
This view may be debated, agreed and refined leading to rep-
resentative personas that can be built upon with relevant
supporting scenarios (Nielsen, 2012). Personas should be gen-
erative and engaging, using scenarios to apply them to relevant
situations.This approach is similarly used in marketing where
persona-focused storytelling is essential to branding (Herskovitz
and Crystal, 2010).
Atzeni et al. (2011) provide an approach that aims to develop
Attacker Personas using the process of data collection, refer-
ence elicitation, affinity diagramming to graphicalise the
problem space, which helps with characteristic develop-
ment, and concludes with the creation of the persona. Faily
and Fléchais (2010a) adopt a user-centred design approach re-
sulting in the creation of personas that may be used for a
number of analysis purposes. Coupling personas with rel-
evant scenarios and expected behaviours can be an effective
means of validating the assumptions made.
Acceptance is an important feature of the design process,
and is based on review, opinions or feedback from the design
team’s participatory interaction. If acceptance becomes an issue,
it is necessary for designers to argue the characteristics of per-
sonas. Faily and Fléchais (2010b) illustrate an approach for doing
this usingToulmin’s Model of Argumentation to justify a claim
about a characteristic, strengthening the foundations of the
persona, while guiding the elicitation and analysis process. Per-
sonas may then be disseminated using programme specific
scenarios, and should be reviewed annually to confirm the rel-
evance of certain personas, carry out updates to the descrip-
tions, or create new versions when required (Nielsen, 2012).
A more general approach taken by Stewart (2014) is based
upon the Pareto principle, whereby in the context of security
and awareness, 80% of the risk to be addressed derives from
20% of the topics to be covered. Therefore, the challenge of
identifying relevant topics is addressed using personas. Inter-
views are undertaken with a target sample of the audience,
which may equate to between 8–12 personas covering a range
of departments. Relevant risks and behaviours towards secu-
rity are assessed leading to the creation of targeted awareness
materials, which may incorporate personas enabling their
characters to become embedded within the organisation
(Stewart, 2014).
The output incorporating the persona characters and com-
munication of the persona-based awareness is suited towards
internal or online means of standard communication, posters,
or flyers. Hand-outs or novelty giveaway promotional itemsmay
also act as future guides or reminders towards awareness (Pruitt
and Grudin, 2003). Research carried out by Hochleitner et al.
(2013) gave a specific focus towards giveaway promotional items
that integrated personas.This considered seven different mar-
keting styled items providing information relating to each
persona.
When comparing the effectiveness of long-living market-
ing materials against consumables, the consumables such as
birthday cake, QR code cookies, or bottled drinks offered a fun
and quirky interaction towards the personas, yet offered the
least amount of information. Long-living materials such as a
persona savings box or posters presented more information
about the persona, but had the least interactivity. This sug-
gested technological applications such as online quizzes could
be incorporated to improve the efficiency and interactivity of
long-living materials (Hochleitner et al., 2013).
Previous work by Pruitt and Grudin (2003) identified poten-
tial issues when using personas. For example, incorrect
construction of personas without using relevant data led to un-
believable character types being created. Other issues include
a lack of budget or resource towards the design, implemen-
tation, and suitable delivery methods. Or, the potential use of
personas was not maximised, contributing to a lack of under-
standing towards how personas could be applied across the
development and implementation cycles (Pruitt and Grudin,
2003). Personas may however be maximised by introducing ini-
tiatives such as a persona “Fact of the Week” campaign that
could utilise email as a delivery medium.
In summary, for personas to be successful they should be
grounded in data relevant to the business and their employ-
ees, and support focused requirements using participatory or
cooperative design methods that give focus towards users. In-
tegrating the personas with story-based scenarios to consider
how they would apply to the persona can achieve engagement
and anticipation towards user behaviours. Moreover, by maxi-
mising the use of personas this increases the likelihood of
success within a programme (Pruitt and Grudin, 2003). Personas
also have the potential to be used within the Social Engineer-
ing card game (Beckers and Pape, 2016) as an awareness activity
in group or team meeting environments, or be integrated
throughout the business embedding them into the culture.
3. Methodology
When considering the research of related work, despite a wealth
of security awareness approaches,many focus on standard com-
pliance related awareness topics. Very few, however, really
consider relevant business-specific human factors identify-
ing actual security awareness needs of people interacting with
process and technology to support business goals. None offer
a consistent HCI method of integrating human factors into se-
curity awareness using personas.
When designing for the user, the integration of HCI tools
such as personas was found to offer requirements engineers
or user-experience designers an important and useful means
of understanding the user audience behaviours, needs and
goals. Personas also offer potential towards security require-
ments for identifying risks (Faily and Fléchais, 2010a) that may
otherwise have not been considered.The concept of using per-
sonas for awareness was discussed (Stewart, 2014) along with
approaches towards incorporating personas in awareness ma-
terials (Hochleitner et al., 2013; Pruitt and Grudin, 2003).
To align HCI concepts with security awareness, we consid-
ered areas of benefit for integrating personas to identify
business-specific needs and goals of users. This would aim to
provide a means of addressing human factor related security
risks, leading to a tailored approach to security awareness ac-
tivities. From the review of current awareness approaches, we
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identified challenges and strengths of programme steps and
communication approaches. The need for interaction, partici-
pation and co-operation was presented as a consistent theme
adding greater success factors to awareness programmes.
We then considered how personas could integrate into a
cycle of steps and activities for design and implementation of
security awareness. Most widely used awareness approaches
reviewed contained between 3–7 steps to establish: Needs and
goals, for design and development, implementation, and a
review and measure of effectiveness. Methods from these ap-
proaches best suited to assist the integration of personas were
identified.This enabled general steps and considerations to form
the basis of our proposed methodology, some of which were
tested with Company X.
Fig. 1 shows the main steps of the life-cycle beginning with
a preliminary step and continues with six on-going steps in-
heriting many of the positive consistent features discussed
within Section 2. However, the key feature of this particular
approach includes the use of personas at the design stage, with
options for further use within the campaign communica-
tions. Personas could also be utilised outside of awareness
activities addressing other security risks.
By following the steps of the methodology, we aimed to
provide a framework offering specific, measurable, attain-
able, realistic and timely objectives towards meeting the goals.
This allows flexibility of integration into business-as-usual ac-
tivities, while adapting the process to suit business type and
needs.The process can be maintained by a working group pro-
viding oversight and review on a quarterly or annual basis.
Personas may then to be refreshed and updated, ensuring they
continue to accurately reflect business user needs and secu-
rity risks related to the current threat landscape.
3.1. Preliminary step
Before a programme can begin, it must be driven by a busi-
ness need and supported requirement for implementation.To
achieve this goal, a business decision to commit to on-going
Information Security awareness should be given, with Senior
management buy-in, support and commitment. A Stake-
holder team of representatives from key departments across
the business should be initiated, conducting introductory
meetings to set up the initial project team and objectives.
Inter-departmental co-operation towards engaging with aware-
ness activities and promoting a security culture is paramount
to its success.
3.2. Step 1 - Needs and goals
To focus and prioritise the programme output, activities are
used to elicit business needs and goals towards Information
Security awareness. These include assessments, surveys and
focus groups to establish business needs and current secu-
rity culture, locations, risks, roles, responsibilities, resource,
budget, and any other identified project related dependen-
cies. Current awareness threat trends should also be considered,
together with issues or breaches where human behaviour was
the likely root cause. A current snap-shot of metrics relevant
to Information Security issues should also be established. Finally,
general requirements and the target audience should be con-
firmed before choosing a theme, and conducting topic-specific
research.
3.3. Step 2 - Personas
This step is perhaps the most crucial given the dependency
on integrating personas as a tool to identify human factors and
security risk. This should begin by organising interviews with
a random selection of users from across the business. The in-
terviews are used as a basis to gain necessary data for
constructing personas. Interview questions should be pre-
pared before conducting interviews for persona data collection
to ensure context specific questions are incorporated.
Interviews can be recorded then user responses are tran-
scribed to enable elicitation of relevant behaviours from data.
Alternatively, good note-taking of interviews could be used, but
is harder to elicit data in detail. The identified characteristics
are written on post-it notes as factoids, then grouped based
on behavioural clusters. Relevant information to support each
persona are drawn from the grouped factoids then presented
as affinity diagrams leading to the creation of persona tem-
plates. Based on findings from the empirical data, these
templates are elaborated into detailed archetypes of typical
users suitably tailored to the business.
Throughout the creation of personas, it is important tomain-
tain traceability from the data to the finished persona to ensure
the credibility of each persona and their characteristics. Ar-
tistic licence may be permitted when bringing to life the
archetypical character, such as choosing a representative pho-
tograph to help humanise the persona, or describing their back
story. However, to ensure they are archetypes, the core of the
persona, e.g. their attitudes, motivations and business context,
must be derived from the data. Each persona can then be pre-
sented in such a way to begin to reap the benefits of business-
specific user models brought to life as recognisable employee
archetypes.
Fig. 1 – Persona-centred information security awareness
methodology cycle.
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When repeating the awareness cycle, personas may be re-
viewed during the following cycle, but may be replaced with
new versions annually, or as required. This is to ensure that
as the threats evolve, or security culture and awareness im-
proves, personas continue to accurately reflect current business
user needs and security risks, for which we can address through
tailored security awareness.
3.4. Step 3 - Analysis
A critical analysis is undertaken against the identified
behaviours and characteristics of each persona. This is con-
sidered against business needs, risks and requirements to
establish and prioritise awareness needs. Using simple con-
sistent rules of behaviour, desired behaviours can be considered
with realistic expectations to integrate persona needs using
scenario-based contexts. Business risks, issues, needs and goals
are considered against persona roles, together with behaviours,
cultural contexts, differences in risk perceptions, and the ap-
plicable skill-sets required to apply the learning. Stakeholders
are encouraged to participate in the creative design process.
Any other relevant points and observations can then be con-
sidered before target behaviours and areas for relevant
awareness content delivery are agreed.
3.5. Step 4 - Design and development
Design requirements to address identified security risks are
derived from critical analysis and topic-specific research.This
provides direction for design and development of tailored
content, whilst utilising available resources and means of
communication.
Updates to future iterations that may currently be out-of-
scope are considered for planning at a later stage, e.g. system-
based awareness. Delivery methods and resources should be
agreed considering ease of use, scalability, interactivity, and an
element of accountability. Awareness that engages people on
a personal level should be applied, which can motivate and
empower employees to play an active role in Information
Security.
Content requirements are specified for a consistent message
delivered across various channels. Branding can be incorpo-
rated, making the material relevant and personalised to the
organisation, its goals and people, promoting Information Se-
curity to employees as a product. Other required styling may
be incorporated to address elements of emotions, values, im-
pressions and expectations leading to relevant design content
and context. How the personas can be incorporated into aware-
ness material output can be considered, thus maximising their
potential where possible.
Participatory design methods for communication may in-
corporate games, quizzes, short video clips, or short topic briefs
included in team meetings. Also, posters, novelty or promo-
tional items, Web and system-based development tools. Or,
guidelines, booklets, on-going news sections, online and Social
Media alerts, surveys, or forums. Industry proven security best
practices could also be used to provide content of awareness
material.There are a number of options available, however these
should be tailored to the context of persona and business needs,
using available resource and budget.
3.6. Step 5 - Implement
To ensure a timely implementation, a roll-out strategy should
be prepared taking into account the required staff availabil-
ity and other business priorities.The delivery of tailored content
and communication methods around other priorities should
be planned and implemented. Baseline metrics relevant to the
audience and awareness cycle should be established, and the
effectiveness of certain elements of the awareness activities
is measured where required.
3.7. Step 6 - Review
The Review stage provides feedback-loops to identify the ef-
fectiveness, benefits, drawbacks, and improvements for the
awareness cycle. Evaluation metrics might vary in type de-
pendent upon the nature of the business, but may measure
effectiveness of the awareness cycle against baseline metrics.
On-going effectiveness may use feedback mechanisms, such
as manual and automated logging, system and internet logging,
monitoring and tracking.Also, issue reporting, root-cause analy-
sis, Helpdesk trends, e.g. password resets, desk and environment
spot-checks, surveys or questionnaires, internal Phishing or
Social Engineering campaigns.
Review the findings to understand and agree required
updates or modifications to policies, procedures, or the aware-
ness process. Consider new technology or threats to be
incorporated into subsequent revisions of the cycle, ensuring
it remains up-to-date and effective against current business
and persona needs. Continue back to Step 1, repeating the on-
going 90-day cycle by first establishing the current business
risks, threats and goals for the next cycle.
4. Applying the methodology – findings
To support design, implementation and testing of certain el-
ements of the persona-centred awareness methodology, we
applied our approach to a case-study business referred to as
Company X. This specifically helped us validate the notion of
personas being used as a means of addressing human factors
security risks, for which guides the selection and design of tai-
lored security awareness. Also tested were specific parts of the
proposed process steps that could be used to integrate the use
of personas within a security awareness cycle.
Due to limitations of the available time-frame for testing,
combined with other business priorities for Company X, some
task outputs from the preliminary step and Step 1 of the meth-
odology were assumed to some degree.This was supported by
interviews and observations confirming senior management
and the business as a whole were already very security focused
and committed.The willingness to participate in trying some-
thing new to improve their security awareness was another
positive indication.Testing of the project therefore begins with
the relevant theme and topic-specific research at the end of
Step 1, findings of which are discussed in Section 4.1.
4.1. Step 1 - Needs and goals
Preliminary discussions with Company X took place to manage
requirements and expectations, understand the culture,
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business needs and goals. It was determined topics relating
to Social Engineering would be the chosen theme for the current
instalment of the awareness programme. Social Engineering
can be described as means of manipulating people by decep-
tion into performing an action or giving out information (Mann,
2012), which can bypass or undermine other technological se-
curity controls.
Card games such as Ctrl-Alt-Hack are designed to help
improve security awareness in group-based environments
(Denning et al., 2013). A similar type of game developed by
Beckers and Pape (2016) acts as a training activity on Social En-
gineering techniques with the aim of identifying possible
weaknesses. As part of our topic specific research, we evalu-
ated this Social Engineering card game, where a number of
attack types were carried out by players against a pre-designed
persona, their system or workstation. The game-play was at
first a little slow whilst understanding the game mechanics,
but improved with repetition, allowing focus to be on the aware-
ness of attack types and styles. Participants had a good level
of understanding towards the subject matter, so it was unclear
how less technically experienced people may understand the
game or terminology.This suggested the game may be an ideal
candidate for implementation.
4.2. Step 2 - Personas
A number of approaches towards the design and use of per-
sonas were considered. Given the nature of the application and
context of the business, a goal-based approach was largely
adopted with some role-based elements. The process for
persona creation can be viewed similar to that of Atzeni et al.
(2011).
In preparation to begin the process, interview questions were
created for data collection leaving scope for additional ques-
tions where required. These would aim to elicit relevant
information from employees describing behaviours and per-
ceptions relating to the business and Information Security. Nine
interviews were conducted with randomly selected employ-
ees based on their availability during the interview day.
According to Yin (2013), randomisation is also said to assist with
data validity. The interviews offered insights into day-to-day
life covering a range of roles and experience at Company X,
demonstrating a generally security minded culture with a posi-
tive attitude towards Company X.
The audio recorded interviews were transcribed to give text-
based accounts, then reviewed to identify relevant behaviours,
characteristics and perceptions that could be extracted. The
identified information was written onto post-it-notes and placed
on a wall into categories based on the approach used by Cooper
et al. (2014) to broadly identify:
Aptitudes –What education and training the user has, and
ability to learn;
Skills – User abilities related to the product domain and
technology;
Activities – What the user does, frequency and volume;
Motivations – Why the user is engaged in the product
domain;
Attitudes – How the user thinks about the product domain
and technology.
Through analysis, 281 relevant pieces of data were identi-
fied corresponding to various activities, behaviours and
perceptions. These were sub-grouped into variable types such
as internal and external motivations, or differing attitudes
towards awareness, risks or challenges. The data were dupli-
cated into the affinity diagrams for further visual analysis.The
Activities grouping, for example, and its six distinct sub-
groupings demonstrated a likely split in persona roles. It should
however be noted that although the design approach for the
personas lends itself towards a goal-based approach, it was
useful to determine the likely roles to help with the represen-
tative split of the other data categories.
As a means of comparing the persona role data, Company
X recommended the use of a Radar diagram to visually dem-
onstrate the most common roles or activities from the data
listed; these were often used within Company X when creat-
ing user-experience personas for system design purposes.After
a number of tests, the best approach of comparing data in the
diagram was to divide the generally perceived percentage of
workload for each person interviewed, then re-order the rows
of data relating to interviewees whereby the data visually flowed
and activities crossed over various role types. For example, a
typical person from IT may devote 100% of their day to tech-
nical activities, whereas a person at Manager level would split
their time between client and team management or other
activities.
Based on the output of data specific to the business, roles,
users, and behaviours, it was determined that three perso-
nas could be derived, each of which presented relevant
characteristics and behaviours to address. To keep within the
context of Company X, gender and age of the personas were
derived based on the interviewees. For example, persona one
was based on twomales and one female, generally in their 20’s.
The remaining behaviour data were colour-coded consis-
tent with the Radar diagram. This provided visual validation
of relevant behaviours and perceptions applicable to each
persona, enabling traceability from the persona to the affin-
ity diagrams and relevant factoids applied, originating from
business users. Images representative of each persona were
sourced online under a Creative Commons License, enabling
each persona to be viewed as a fictional person, bringing the
three archetypes to life. The images were also helpful towards
visualising and reflecting on the persona as an archetype, not
a stereotype, when applying a story-based narrative aligned
with the main behaviours and perceptions.
When validating the design of the personas with Company
X, although the persona descriptions were deemed as appro-
priate representations of business users, the wordiness of the
full personas was noted. Therefore, it was suggested that the
descriptions could be broken into bullet points presenting an
overview for each persona. This prompted development of a
further Lite version of the personas, using another approach
by Cooper et al. (2014) to identify each persona’s Life, Experi-
ence and End Goals.The full personas were reviewed to identify
descriptions within these categories and refined to a one-
line summarised statement, resulting in a more concise
overview for each persona.
It could be argued this summarising approach may have
been used with the post-it-note wall, however, it was impor-
tant to maintain a high degree of fact-finding and original
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context as closely as possible. By doing this, the intention was
to strengthen data validity by providing a true account within
the main persona templates, allowing for further refinement
if required. This reduces risk of persona characteristics be-
coming overly diluted or deviating from the data they were
based on.
4.3. Step 3 - Analysis
With the personas designed and validated, Company X agreed
relevant awareness needs and learning styles applying to each
persona could be analysed. However, the lite-personas offered
less applicable detail in comparison to the full personas, sug-
gesting they may be better incorporated into outputs and
communications.The full personas were therefore used to elicit
relevant needs, points and observations indicating learning
styles and level of detail required. This was achieved by con-
sidering how each persona would act or respond in a given
business scenario. Their motivations, attitudes and under-
standing could then be analysed to identify any weaknesses
towards security. The personas did, however, demonstrate a
good level of understanding or existing awareness, and that
some mechanisms were already successfully used within
Company X.
During analysis, this information was further considered
in the context of the company, its culture, current processes
and procedures, workloads and the type of clients they work
with, and how the theme of Social Engineering applies. Also
of consideration were the Cyber Security Essentials (Gov.UK,
2015) and ISO 27001 (British Standards Institution, 2016) ac-
creditations in place with the risks, needs and requirements
for maintaining these. ISO 27001 audits were frequently carried
out. Therefore, practising security was essential to the busi-
ness given their types of clients, ranging from small businesses
to government organisations, whereby security clearances were
required for applicable employees.This was also reflected within
interviews and observations, where certain information could
not be discussed or revealed.
Findings from interviews and observations determined
Company X operated primarily in one location with a second-
ary London office. The culture was fast-flowing, energetic,
technology orientated and generally security minded. A posi-
tive ethos was evident with a desire to continually improve,
being the best at what they do. Security needs were bal-
anced, for example, with internet orWi-Fi connections, where
employees need web access for business and personal pur-
poses to social media or streaming services, using varied
systems or devices. Technological controls were, however, in
place to integrate security seamlessly, many of which were
beyond the users knowledge or control, supported by a number
of relevant policies and procedures addressing human
interactions.
The calibre of new and existing employees covering varied
age ranges and backgrounds, appeared to be maintained to a
high standard. New employees were given a detailed and well-
presented company handbook, and follow a staggered induction
programme to introduce the new starter to company life, ex-
pectations, policies and procedures, including general security
awareness. Company stand-upmeetings take place on a weekly
basis for general updates, and other team meetings may be
carried out when required. People matter to the business, so
there was a good support structure in place and usage of the
internal online system as the central portal for information was
encouraged.
As with some employees, persona three occasionally travels
to meet clients. External security awareness is a consider-
ation for the business, as secure external access to systems
for permitted employees was important for business opera-
tions. Clients and other visitors may also arrive at Company
X for meetings, so there were layered security procedures and
awareness on how this should be managed, along with pro-
cedures for discussing information with third-parties.
Most employees observed had a good level of understand-
ing towards technological subjects and terminology. However,
despite all three personas appearing technically minded, albeit
at differing levels, some consideration should still be given
towards less technical areas of the business or new starters.
The next stage of analysis reconsidered each of the persona
needs from the context of the business overview. This estab-
lished the most relevant approach towards design and
implementation of awareness content tailored to business and
audience needs. For example, workloads were high and time
management was maximised where possible to meet busi-
ness, client and security needs.
To be most effective, it was identified methods should there-
fore cause least interruption to daily activities, be interactive
or participatory, and incorporated into existing team meet-
ings. This could include the Social Engineering card game
considered in Step 1, quizzes, short video clips, topic briefs,
or guidelines, preferably bite-size and to-the-point with user-
friendly language. This would likely suit all persona needs.
However, for persona three, there was an appetite towards
deeper and broader content for certain topics, and the use of
industry-based social media security updates for threat
awareness.
Awareness needs may be further supported by displaying
relevant awareness posters, utilising the internal online system
implementing awareness material, alerts and on-going news.
Use of desktop backgrounds and screensavers was discussed
with Company X. However, based on their usability experi-
ence, for desk-based employees background images are
often obscured and overlooked, and screensavers become an-
noying after continual display over time. It was therefore
concluded these may be counter-productive and would not be
incorporated.
If budget permits, awareness styled novelty or promo-
tional itemsmaximising use of the lite-persona identities within
the designs could provide opportunities for company branded
take-away items. This was, however, out of scope for testing,
as was the development and introduction of a system-based
awareness tool. It was acknowledged such a system could offer
a number of benefits incorporating refresher training and aware-
ness exercises integrating the personas, and be supported by
record keeping functionality. This would likely help reinforce
awareness needs, thus preventing or reducing the likelihood
and impact of security-based risks, and was a likely consid-
eration for the future.
A cost-benefit-analysis may wish to be considered to
examine advantages and disadvantages of developing a system
in-house compared to that of existing third-party systems or
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services. As with many awareness approaches, this may be dif-
ficult to quantify financially. However, when compared with
the potential of costs, losses and reputational damage result-
ing from a data breach, the on-going system costs for an
awareness tool or other recommended activities may be
minimal in the long-term by comparison.
4.4. Step 4 - Design and development
After concluding the analysis in Step 3, recommended primary
awareness communications were selected.These included the
Social Engineering card game, short topic briefs, quizzes,
factsheets, and short video clips, incorporated into existing team
meetings. Secondary communications included relevant aware-
ness posters, use of the internal online system to publish on-
going updates, short guidelines, booklets or factsheets,
integrating personas where possible.
The thematic needs of Social Engineering awareness were
considered against business-specific persona needs and
behaviours. Findings indicated applicable topics should include
visitor and ID badge requirements, prevention of unauthorised
access to systems or buildings, shoulder surfing, reverse Social
Engineering, insider targeting, and types of Phishing.Web users
would benefit from awareness of online attacks such as water-
holing and pop-up windows, and risks towards themselves or
the business when using social media – and what to do in the
event of these occurring.
In all cases, there should however be an acceptance towards
areas of human factors that may be vulnerable and could there-
fore be improved upon. For example, persona one would
specifically benefit from awareness of Voice of Authority or
Third-party authorisation attacks. Persona three would benefit
from awareness of preventing in-person Social Engineering
attacks whilst working externally.
A number of these relevant topics were addressed by the
Social Engineering card game.This provides for interactive and
participatory awareness building towards risks of Social En-
gineering, where the purpose is to explore attack scenarios and
approaches applicable to Company X.When designing the game
board, it is suggested this should duplicate the actual busi-
ness layout to benefit from its familiarity towards locations of
systems, devices or other attack vectors. However, in agree-
ment with Company X to reduce security risk towards the
business, a generic floor plan was instead created with some
basic similarities, meaning it was still fit-for-purpose meeting
the needs of Company X.
Within the game, each player would carry out an attack on
one of the personas using the cards selected.The persona would
be allocated their workstation within the game board. The at-
tacker has to determine whether they are an insider or outsider,
and how they would gain access to the building, systems or
data relevant to the persona. As a group, the likelihood of ap-
plicability and success of the attack type is discussed, then
concludes a score for the player, before moving on to the next
player.
Secondary communications may incorporate posters from
online awareness resources, a selection of which were printed
and discussed with Company X. These covered Social Engi-
neering topics ranging from simple and to-the-point, detailed,
graphical, movie style and comical cat posters. When
considering the personas and culture, Company X deter-
mined the comical cat posters would likely be most accepted.
Continuing to support the theme, quizzes could offer
fun bite-sized awareness. One option was to use free and
reputable online quizzes (GetSafeOnline, 2016; OpenDNS,
2016) or a downloadable Phishing e-learning module
(TheSecurityAwarenessCompany, 2015), used individually or as
a fun group or team meeting awareness building exercise. An
introduction to the team meeting and the theme of Social En-
gineering could utilise short videos, such as an interview with
insights from professional Social Engineer Jenny Radcliffe, who
touches on many key points relevant to businesses and Social
Engineering (Infosecurity Europe, 2015).
Company X determined future iterations of the cycle could
include awareness videos made with in-house technology, or
demonstrations could be arranged to show the ease of system
exploits. Internal Phishing campaigns could be developed, or
a Social Engineer Penetration test could be arranged. However,
before activities of this nature would be implemented, it was
confirmed considerable discussions should take place to iden-
tify advantages and disadvantages of such a test. For example,
where this may create a risk of distrust between the busi-
ness and its employees. The focus therefore prioritised the
implementation approach agreed with Company X based on
the personas.
4.5. Step 5 - Implement
As time required for full implementation and review would fall
outside of the testing time-framewith Company X, it was agreed
a primary and secondary communication method would be
tested.Testing of the secondary supports validation of the tar-
geted awareness material and design based on persona needs.
Aspects of this are considered when testing the primarymethod
that supports validation towards incorporating personas within
awareness output.
Two simulated team meetings were used whereby the card
game and a review of preselected awareness posters could be
tested. Each meeting lasted up to an hour, with the first group
consisting of four employees from more technical roles. The
second group had three employees from less technical roles,
supported by the security manager with the game-play. Both
groups were introduced to the purpose of the meeting, the
design and use of personas, and how they applied to company
awareness, the game and floor plan.
The more technical group were able to understand game
terminology, scenarios and principles with ease. Much discus-
sion time was spent debating in technical terms how attacks
may be improved at the company using particular approaches
or technology. The less technical group were slower by com-
parison to understand the game, and were appreciative of the
manager support helping describe attack scenarios and prin-
ciples by relating them to the business using analogies. This
promoted further discussion where they identified tech-
niques that may be used in the public domain. Both groups
engaged in fun discussions throughout each round of the game,
demonstrating to some degree the game was creating aware-
ness through discussion based on the game content. In both
cases, the floor plan became almost redundant and instead
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relied on discussion and visualisation to walk-through attacks
within the company.
The concept of using personas to identify and tailor aware-
ness needs and their integration into the game output was
generally understood. However, for game-play, group members
did not have time to fully absorb the persona templates, and
were more distracted by the need to understand the concept
of the game and Social Engineering. Participants found the use
of personas as victims was useful, as most group members
could imagine working with them or having similarities to other
employees. For example, both groups identified persona one
was susceptible toVoice of Authority attacks. Interestingly, this
part validated findings of Step 4 where this was previously
identified.
Some group members felt a focus on how they them-
selves may be a victim would have been more useful.That said,
throughout the game, there were constant reflections on how
the scenarios may apply to themselves, colleagues or even their
family. Therefore, it could be argued this need was still met,
thus promoting awareness.
After game completion, group members individually pro-
vided feedback towards the game and its integration with
personas. The remainder of the session then turned focus
towards the preselected awareness posters. Ten posters were
sourced online and two posters were created to represent a
theme that was basic and to-the-point. Group members indi-
vidually reviewed the posters, considering which posters they
believed would be appealing and effective in raising aware-
ness within the company culture. This offered a sense of
empowerment and participation towards internal awareness
activities.The findings of the game and poster reviews are dis-
cussed in Section 4.6.
4.6. Step 6 - Review
Given the project time-frame and other business priorities, it
was not possible to obtain a baseline metric towards measur-
ing the effectiveness of the awareness cycle. Furthermore, at
the conclusion of the activities, it was not appropriate to apply
and review manual or automated feedback mechanisms sug-
gested in previous sections. These were considered long-
term measures that would be reviewed after the completion
of the cycle that would end outside of the time-frame working
with Company X.
However, in addition to the verbal feedback from manage-
ment and staff regarding the integration of personas, two
opportunities were used to offer feedback towards the effec-
tiveness of the awareness activities. Following this feedback
process assisted in validating certain parts of the process. A
game review formwas used to gain feedback towards the Social
Engineering card game that integrated personas assisting in
raising awareness of Social Engineering techniques. A poster
review form and guide sheet was used to gain feedback towards
the likely appeal and effectiveness of the awareness posters,
previously selected based on the personas.
Poster findings demonstrated a varied appeal in both groups,
as individuals had differing likes and dislikes towards the as-
cetics,wording or overall appeal and use in the company culture.
This suggested that regardless of the gender, age or technical
expertise, each person had different tastes, meaning a range of
posters should be considered. Feedback indicated which posters
were likely to have a positive impact, although the long-term
impact would need to be considered at a later stage, consider-
ing whether they would be overlooked after the 90-day cycle.
Interestingly, the cute comical cat posters were considered fun
and humorous, which suited the culture, although other posters
could still be an option.This finding in particular validates where
Company X determined in Step 4, based on the personas the
comical cat posters would likely be accepted.
Game findings suggested it was well received and did
promote awareness. The more technical group members felt
they were more familiar with the topic and gained the least
awareness, although once the game-play was understood, the
less technical group gained the most security awareness.
When combining these findings together, we found that par-
ticipants were at first unsure or unaware of the persona concept.
They were more used to stereotypes found online or in maga-
zines. Once they understood these were instead archetypes
based on real data from their colleagues, they were able to ap-
preciate the benefits better. This was evident throughout the
game where participants could identify with them as other em-
ployees. At an employee level, the personas were more visible
within the output, but gave less focus towards the awareness
being based on personas.Whereas, at management level, the
benefits of using personas as a means for identifying human
factor security risks was accepted as an approach towards tai-
loring awareness, although integrating themwithin output was
secondary.
5. Discussion
The aim of our work was to develop a user-centred approach
integrating the use of personas to identify business-specific
human factors and security risk to be addressed within aware-
ness activities. To enable the integration of personas with
awareness activities, a persona-centred on-going Informa-
tion Security awareness solution was proposed.This aimed to
reduce or mitigate related Information Security risks through
business tailored security awareness output.
However, to test these concepts, the project required a case-
study business for data elicitation to build personas based on
their employees, and tailor subsequent activities to its busi-
ness needs. Despite approaching companies in good time, some
difficulties were experienced in securing a company to work
with.Although candidates provided positive feedback, the reality
was, companies were unable to support the project. Either with
time constraints, provide any type of supervisory support, re-
source or budget, regardless that much of the project would
be delivered at no cost, compared to the use of external con-
sultant services. From a different perspective, this demonstrates
the reality businesses face when considering, planning or imple-
menting such a programme, when other priorities, budgets and
resource are already stretched.
Company X kindly offered their assistance to test and vali-
date our work. However, as there was insufficient time for
Company X to plan or build this project into weekly activities,
some limitations would apply.Working with Company X enabled
testing of many features from the proposed methodology, pro-
viding the business a means for implementing on-going
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awareness. Company X were consulted at each stage of the
process, considering research findings leading to the general ap-
proach and application of the persona-centred methodology,
creating a cycle of activities tailored to business and persona
needs.
Considering threats to validity described by Yin (2013), e.g.
Internal, External, Construct and Reliability validity, we first con-
sider the notion that personas can be used as a tool to elicit
behaviours and characteristics from a given audience. Once de-
veloped from empirical data, personas were specifically
validated with Company X who agreed their appropriate-
ness. The elicitation of human factor security risks from the
personas leading to tailored output was part validated with
Company X at selection stage, and again from participant feed-
back at implementation and testing. Data quality from persona
findings is likely to be subject to the ability and understand-
ing of those applying the process and resources available.
Business type and context may impact on external validity with
differing results, yet will still provide empirical data.
To assist the integration of personas into an awareness
process, we identified consistent process steps from other
common frameworks and approaches to create a structured
persona-centred methodology. This also helps with construct
validity by defining the problem space and steps to address
it, and reliability validity to ensure process repetition.The full
validity of the process was more difficult to confirm due to
shortened time-scales for testing. Elements described that were
tested enabled a useful and structured means of applying the
personas in each step. For example, once elicited, tailored aware-
ness needs could then be matched to the business context with
optimal communication methods using available resource.
Although full testing of the process as an on-going cycle
could not completed, feedback gained from activities tested sug-
gested an approach using personas has potential benefits
towards addressing security related human factors. Commu-
nication methods of a card game and posters generally worked
for Company X. In combination, this helped raise most indi-
viduals awareness, albeit at differing levels, and had positive
effects on creating participatory discussion promoting a se-
curity minded culture.
6. Conclusion
We presented the development and application of a persona-
centred on-going Information Security awareness solution for
the workplace. Specifically, we tested the concept of design-
ing for the user by integrating personas. This HCI approach is
used to bridge the gap between standard awareness ap-
proaches by incorporating business-specific human factor
security risks, leading to tailored security awareness output.
A review of related work, personas, approaches and frame-
works was undertaken to understand how such an approach
could be combined. From this, a persona-centred methodol-
ogy was devised and largely tested with a case-study business.
Personas were constructed based on empirical data rel-
evant to the business, providing a useful means to identify
audience awareness needs, communicated with a predefined
security theme for the programme cycle.However, the personas
generated were generally based on more technical roles.
Collection of data from less technical roles providing a balanced
spread of the business audience would be more appropriate
when fully applying thismethodology in a real-world scenario.
Individual persona roles could also be used to identify needs
at a team or department level, or for other related purposes.
For example, application to security risk assessment, or related
control and procedure modifications. Despite test environ-
ment limitations, personas appeared to offer a good level of
value towards the design process, demonstrating potential for
their overall effectiveness as a persona-centred tool for ad-
dressing human factors in security awareness.
In both workload and analysis, work conducted with per-
sonas took time to produce and validate, yet provided a useful
and relevant method for tailoring security awareness needs.
It was, however, unclear how effective selected activities would
be over time towards changing and improving behaviours.
Further consideration may need to be given towards embed-
ding personas into the business and awareness programme
output, such as promotional take-away items.
Having carefully and methodically considered appropriate
steps and tasks for the persona-centred methodology, appli-
cation of the process with Company X appeared to work well
and offered value towards an area theywished to improve upon.
Although Company X were already very security minded, the
test subjects appeared to benefit from activities that could, for
example, be participative and incorporated into a teammeeting,
providing an indication the application of themethodologywas
positive.
By continuing to embed this process into business-as-
usual activities, it is likely this process could be adapted to suit
business needs, whilst providing the flexibility to evolve. This
also gave Company X ideas of how other updates may be de-
livered.The inclusion of a system-based tool for computer based
training and awareness was considered a future advantage for
extending awareness.
Further work relating to the programme’s long-term effec-
tiveness of improving behaviours, reducing risks and embedding
security into an unconscious routine, would also be of inter-
est to validate its long-term effects. To further enhance its
validity, this process may also be trialled in a smaller less se-
curity orientated business, or indeed as part of a larger national
organisation to observe any differences in the approach re-
quired. That said, the process is presented at a level whereby
the steps could be followed in most scenarios, or integrated
with other risk or awareness approaches, retaining the main
feature or novelty of our approach using personas; archetypes
based on real business users, needs and behaviours, as a means
for identifying workplace security awareness needs.
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